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ON INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK AND THE
INTERNET: THE LANHAM ACT’S LONG ARMS
Joshua Clowers*
I. INTRODUCTION: TRADEMARK LAW, THE LANHAM ACT, AND THE
INTERNET
A. AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK LAW
[1] Trademarks tie a face to a product. The face is often a name or
symbol, but it can also be something like a sound, a smell or even a
“look.”1 They exist for the benefit of both the trademark owner/producer
and the consumer. The purpose of a trademark, traditionally, has been to
protect against the confusion of consumers when selecting products or
services.2 Yet, a trademark’s functionality is not limited to preventing
confusion. Other uses include both preserving the goodwill of the
consumer for the mark owner and preventing the “diversion of trade
through commercial misrepresentations.”3 Trademark is a system by

* J.D., 2006, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law. Mr. Clowers is an
Associate at the law firm of Dunton, Simmons & Dunton in White Stone, Virginia. He
served as the Annual Survey Editor for the Richmond Journal of Law & Technology in
2005-2006. He completed his B.A. in Political Science at Virginia Tech and has an
extensive technical and computer background. He wishes to thank his advisor, Professor
James Gibson, for his guidance and support in this endeavor, and Beth, for her constant
inspiration and for letting him keep his aquarium at her house.
1

The concept of “trade dress” (essentially the “look” of a product) has repeatedly been
upheld as protected under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15
U.S.C. 1125(a) (2000).
2
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989).
3
Steven M. Auvil, Gray market Goods Produced by Foreign Affiliates of the U.S.
Trademark Owner: Should the Lanham Act Provide a Remedy?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 437,
447 (Spring 1995).

1

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

which consumers may choose between readily identifiable and
distinguishable goods based on the reputation of a manufacturing
company.4 Congress has regarded trademark protection as being an
indispensable component of American business, as it provides the
necessary incentive to a business to maintain quality standards in order to
preserve the value of their trademark.5 Because of this considerable value,
Congress has designated that the government should afford trademarks the
greatest protection possible within the United States.6
[2] The value of trademarks to producers and other trademark owners lies
in a mark’s capability to lower the search costs for consumers, thus
generating value in the form of what has been termed “information
capital.”7 Information capital is a value embodied by the message or
reputation conveyed by the trademark.8 Trademarks perform a filtering
function for consumers, wherein they are able to lower the time and cost
expended searching for a product based on the trustworthiness of a
producer’s mark.9 Without the safeguard of law offered to a trademark,
the utility of this filtering function is rendered into what amounts to “lame
duck”10 protection, both for the consumer and the producer.11 A producer
who properly maintains quality and service standards for its mark will be
able to take advantage of the economic benefits resulting from the maxim
of a consumer’s willingness to pay higher prices for the assurances that
come with a familiar and reputable mark.12 This economic benefit,
however, again depends completely on the protection offered to a mark

4

Dupont v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.A.N.N. 1274,
1277.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 1277.
7
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law,
78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270 (May – June 1986).
8
Id.
9
Landes, supra note 7, at 271.
10
The term “lame duck” here is meant to indicate the ineffectiveness of something
purported to be serving a function. While the term is typically applicable to an elected
officer who is sitting in office but not continuing into the next term, it seems appropriate
to characterize this circumstance as such.
11
Landes, supra note 7, at 270.
12
Id.
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holder from the “free riding”13 of competitors and other profit-seekers
aiming to dilute, infringe upon, or otherwise benefit from another’s
trademark.14 Without this protection, the incentive for developing a
valuable trademark in the first place dissipates.15
[3] At common law, trademark consisted of a word, phrase, logo, pattern,
color, design, or other indicator of the source of a product.16 During the
evolution of trademark law, mechanisms that qualify as a trademark for
protection purposes have been extended to sounds and smells in addition
to their visual counterparts.17 It is possible that even digital signatures or
cryptographic marks, so long as they still serve the basic trademark
purpose of indicating the source of a product may qualify for at least some
level of trademark protection as the evolution of trademark law
continues.18
[4] The most commonly cited test for finding trademark infringement
comes from the Polaroid case, which sets out a series of factors a court
must weigh in determining whether an entity has used a trademark in such
a way that would result in a “likelihood of confusion” in the mind of a
consumer regarding the source of a product.19 The Polaroid likelihood of
confusion test considers eight different factors:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the degree of
similarity between plaintiff's mark and defendant's mark;
(3) the proximity of the products or services; (4) the
likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5)

13

See id. (stating that the concept of free riding in relation to trademarks refers to a
trademark owner’s competitor attempting to duplicate the owner’s valuable trademark in
an effort to dupe a consumer into believing the free rider’s brand is identical to the
valuable trademark owner’s brand, thus allowing the free rider to garner profits).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, vol.
1, § 3:1 (4th ed. 1997).
17
Id. § 7:104.
18
Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV.
695, 699 (Summer 1998).
19
Poloroid Corp. v. Polorad Elec. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 287
F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
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evidence of actual confusion; (6) defendant's good faith in
adopting the mark; (7) the quality of defendant's product or
service; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.20
Based on these, if a court determines that the totality of the circumstances
leads to the conclusion that a reasonable consumer would be confused as
to the source of a product based on mark, there is a violation of the
trademark law.21 This is called “dilution,” and it exists to prevent
garnering profit through the use of another’s mark.22
[5] Thus far, this article has only broached the tip of the iceberg regarding
the fundamentals of trademark theory, but it is sufficient to lay the
necessary foundation for the remainder of this article.
B. THE HISTORY OF THE LANHAM ACT
[6] The Lanham Act23 provided for the first time both substantive and
procedural rights in trademark.24 Congress implemented the Act in 1946
in an effort to eliminate both “deceitful practices in interstate commerce
involving the misuse of trademarks,” and “other forms of
misrepresentations which are of the same general character even though
they do not involve any use of what can technically be called a trademark.”25 The Lanham Act represents the codification of the federal
trademark statute, which has clarified the definition and scope of a
trademark to include
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish
his or her goods, including a unique product, from those

20

Ryan Isenberg, Trademarks and the Internet, 32 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 229, 234
(2001) (citing Polaroid Corp., 182 F. Supp. at n.19).
21
See id.
22
Id. at 234.
23
The Lanham Act is also commonly known as the Federal Trademark Act of 1946.
24
15 U.S.C. § 1051-1096 (2005).
25
Federated-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 1963).
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manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown.26
Subsequent amendments to the Lanham Act have sought to add to or
clarify this definition,27 but at no point has Congress occasioned to weigh
in on the international application of the Lanham Act.
[7] The Lanham Act has authority to regulate that conduct which is
deemed to occur “in commerce.”28 Unlike patent and copyright law,
Congress does not garner its ability to regulate this arm of intellectual
property law from Article One of the Constitution.29 Instead, it is derived
from the Congress’ power to legislate in matters of interstate and foreign
commerce.30 There are several other ways in which trademark differs
from patent/copyright, but the most notable is that patent and copyright
law confer specific property rights, whereas trademark law only protects
against similar uses.31
[8] The Lanham Act differs from copyright and patent law in another
notable way: it apparently can be (and is) applied to extraterritorial
matters, following the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co.32 and its progeny. Scholars have long debated whether this
international application of the Lanham Act is appropriate, or even
whether it comports with International Law on its face.33 Nevertheless,

26

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2005).
See, e.g., The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, supra note 1.
28
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining commerce as “all conduct which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress”).
29
Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, TrafFix, Moseley,
and Dastar – The Supreme Court’s New Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
237, 239 ( 2005).
30
Id.
31
See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1997).
32
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
33
See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 31, at 540 (arguing against the appropriateness of
applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially); contra Yelena Simonyuk, The
Extraterritorial Reach of Trademark on the Internet, [2002] DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9
(pointing out the language in the Paris Convention impliedly authorizing some
extraterritorial enforcement of trademark law).
27
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neither the Supreme Court nor Congress have taken steps to modify the
Lanham Act’s international reach since the Court’s decision in Steele.
C. TRADEMARK DISPUTES OVER THE INTERNET
[9] “[T]he growing international and transnational nature of commerce,
the spread of digital technology, and the ubiquity of the Internet, which
together have provided a fertile ground for new trademark battles, have
accompanied a broad legislative and judicial expansion of fundamental
trademark concepts.”34 Trademark law in the United States has been
extended from a simple subsidiary of unfair competition law to a complex,
heavily litigated, and ultimately internationally divisive remedial system.35
Not only has the range of subject matter encompassed under trademark
law been augmented, but there has also been an expansive list of specific
remedies proliferated, designed to address corresponding issues
encountered due to technological and political changes in American
society.36
[10] As the Internet has taken its place as a bedrock of American society,
entirely new questions of trademark law have emerged, which have made
the issue of the Lanham Act’s extraterritorial application even more
important. The questions vary in their complexity. For example, what
qualifies as “use” of a trademark on the Internet? Or, because the Internet
itself is an American “product” and is “based” in the United States, does
any conduct on the Internet fall within U.S. trademark jurisdiction? In
other words, could a foreign citizen who publishes a website potentially
become subject to American trademark law? If so, to what extent can the
U.S. government enjoin the active trademark dilution a foreign defendant
[11] This article will examine the international application of the Lanham
Act in the extraterritorial protection and enforcement of trademarks,
particularly with regard to the Internet and e-commerce, and attempt to
prescribe a fair and reasonable solution to the somewhat conflicting
doctrines underlying U.S. versus international trademark protection. Part

34

Halpern, supra note 29, at 237-38.
Id. at 238.
36
Id.
35
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One will center around the Lanham Act as it has been interpreted to apply
internationally, discussing both positive and negative criticisms, as well as
the compatibility of its transboundary scope with overarching international
law. Part Two will accept the international application of the Lanham Act
and discuss how it is being applied to e-commerce on the Internet, paying
special attention to some of the special problems presented by trademark
law over the Internet.
II. BEFORE THE INTERNET: THE INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF THE
LANHAM ACT
A. TRANSBOUNDARY MARKS AND THE PARIS CONVENTION
[12] Generally speaking, a trademark is a function of territory, meaning
that a given trademark will normally only receive protection of exclusive
rights over the mark within a certain territorial boundary.37 The Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property provides for the basis
of international trademark law.38 This philosophy is reflected in Article
6(3) of the Paris Convention, which states “a mark duly registered in a
country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered
in the other countries of the Union, including the country of origin.”39 The
Paris Convention articles go on to contain a “national treatment” tenant
supporting this approach to trademark law jurisdiction, stating that:
[n]ationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other
countries of the Union the advantages that their respective
laws now grant, or may hereinafter grant, to nationals; all
without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by
this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same
protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against
any infringement of their rights, provided that the
37

Timothy H. Hiebert, Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation: Duality and
Universality in Nineteenth Century Trademark Law, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 483 (Sept. –
Oct. 1990).
38
Simonyuk, supra note 33, at 22.
39
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6(3), Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1629, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
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conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are
complied with.40
[13] Based on this, critics of international trademark application argue that
a mark should only be enforced within the borders of the state in which it
is registered; instead, each nation should take responsibility for the
enforcement of trademark law within their own borders, and apply their
own laws to any legal dispute.41 In other words, conduct taking place
outside of the territory of the United States should not fall within the
trademark law jurisdiction of the United States, and thus foreign
infringement of a U.S. trademark does not logically have a place within
U.S. jurisdiction.42
[14] Despite this logic, however, history has repeatedly shown us that
“[f]amous or well-known marks may well leap oceans and rivers, cross
national borders, and span language barriers to achieve international
recognition. They may frequently be protectable even when the foreign
good or service to which they are attached is not yet readily available.”43
It has been argued that the Paris Convention, in Article 6(bis), authorizes a
country to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in some limited cases.44
Article 6 basically states that a member state45 is prohibited from
registering a mark that is a reproduction, imitation, or a translation liable
to create confusion with a well-known mark known to be registered in
another member state for similar goods.46 Some have argued that Article
6 vests a member state with the authority to exercise jurisdiction over an
activity taking place wholly outside of the geographical territory of the
home state of the injured trademark owner.47 But questions remain as to
40

Id.
Bradley, supra note 31, at 538-39.
42
Simonyuk, supra note 33, at 10.
43
Burk, supra note 18, at 720.
44
Simonyuk, supra note 33, at 23.
45
There are 169 member states to the Paris Convention currently in force. See World
Intellectual Property Organization,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Sept.
10, 2006).
46
Paris Convention, supra note 39.
47
See Roger E. Schechter, Comment, The Case for Limited Extraterritorial Reach of the
Lanham Act, 37 VA. J. INT'L. L. 619, 638 (Winter 1997).
41
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whether this is an appropriate interpretation of what the law is implying,
and if so, to what extent is it meant to grant authority?
B. STEELE V. BULOVA WATCH CO.: THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE DROPS
[15] Following the U.S. entry into the Paris Convention in 1896, it was not
entirely clear as to whether the Convention would afford the U.S. latitude
to bring extraterritorial trademark cases into U.S. courts. Congress’ 1905
Trademark legislation, the first modern version of American trademark
statute, did not provide a simple answer to this question.48 After Congress
passed the Lanham Act in 1946 (which was silent as to the international
applicability of the new trademark act), it was not long before the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on this question.49
[16] The seminal case in answering the question of the extraterritorial
applicability of the Lanham Act’s protection for U.S. trademarks is Steele
v. Bulova Watch Co., decided in 1952.50 In this case, a U.S. citizen
obtained the Mexican rights to the widely-known “Bulova” name and
subsequently began to manufacture and sell watches bearing that mark in
Mexico; several of those watches found their way into the United States,
despite being wholly the products of Mexico.51 Bulova brought suit in a
Texas federal district court seeking both injunctive and monetary relief
under the Lanham Act.52 Bulova had only registered their trademark in
the U.S.; Steele had registered in Mexico several years before the
inception of the lawsuit.53 The U.S. Supreme Court found Steele subject
to the Lanham Act’s trademark protection provisions despite the fact that
the apparently infringing behavior occurred outside of the territory of the
United States.54

48

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 9, cmt. e (1995).
See Steele, 244 U.S. at 281-82 (granting certiorari to determine whether a United States
district court has jurisdiction over acts of trademark infringement and unfair competition
carried out in a foreign country).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
49
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[17] In explaining its opinion, the Court stated that there has never been
any dispute as to whether Congress had the authority to regulate the
actions of U.S. citizens in their behavior extraterritorially.55 The Court
pointed out that the Lanham Act specifically was intended to extend to any
commerce over which Congress has the power to legislate.56 The Court
was careful to emphasize the fact that Steele was an American citizen, and
despite the apparent assembly and sale in Mexico, Steele’s conduct “had
effect” within the United States, and so the jurisdiction did not have to
depend on the territory in which the Bulova mark was placed onto the
watch.57 Last, the Court decided that exercising U.S. jurisdiction over the
matter was not contrary to international law, treaties, or the law of
Mexico, based on the fact that Mexico had cancelled the registration of
Steele’s trademark during the course of the litigation.58
[18] In the wake of this decision, many questions were left unanswered,
which lower courts have been forced to wade through in deciding whether
and how to apply the reach of U.S. trademark jurisdiction.59 The Court, in
rendering its decision, failed to articulate exactly on what principles it
based its decision; in doing so, the utility of the opinion in the case
became limited.60 It was never clarified whether Steele’s ties to the U.S.
(most obviously his U.S. citizenship) were dispositive of jurisdictional
issues, or instead whether the presence of the watches in the U.S. was
what made jurisdiction appropriate.61 The Court did not issue a test that
would clarify which issues were determinative to liability imposition or
jurisdiction, nor did it prescribe any indication of what weight to accord
different factors contributing to the liability of a trademark infringer.62
Lower courts have adopted a varying series of tests, which generally
examine some or all of three key factors: first, what effect does the
infringing conduct have on commerce within the United States?; second,
what is the citizenship status of the defendant?; and third, does a conflict

55

Steele, 344 U.S. at 282.
Id. at 284.
57
Id. at 287.
58
Id. at 289.
59
Bradley, supra note 31, at 528.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
56
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actually exists, or is a conflict likely to occur, between U.S. law and the
law of the state in which the conduct takes place?63
[19] As mentioned earlier, it is widely disputed as to whether there has
ever been any authority for the United States to apply its trademark law to
activities occurring outside of its territorial borders. Some commentators
have argued that the Court’s reasoning in Steele missed, and that Congress
never intended for the Lanham Act to apply on an international scale.64
Those commentators argue that, despite widespread dissent (of varying
degrees), Congress has taken no specific action to amend the Lanham Act
to include specific provisions for its international application, even if only
for clarification purposes.65 This is not to say that there has been
congressional inaction with regard to the Lanham Act. To the contrary,
many amendments have been made to the Act in the 45 year period since
the Steele decision.66 Several of these amendments have dealt directly
with sections that have “international implications.”67 Further, the
Lanham Act uses the word “nationwide” where it could have used the
word “worldwide;” had Congress used the word “worldwide” instead, it
would clarify their intent to apply the Act beyond the territory of the
U.S.68
[20] On the other hand, some commentators have argued against these
suggestions, as well. For instance, based on congressional inaction, one
can infer that Congress was satisfied enough with the way in which Steele
interpreted the law that it did not find necessity to amend the statute.69
And, although Congress’s use of the term “nationwide” makes it more
difficult to extrapolate an argument for the extraterritorial application of
the Lanham Act, Congress’s recognition of the declining value of a
trademark should such extraterritorial protection not be offered cannot be

63

Id. (noting that the courts differ on the requisite amount of each prong necessary for a
finding of liability).
64
Bradley, supra note 31, at 531.
65
Id. at n. 160.
66
See, e.g., The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2005).
67
Schechter, supra note 47, at 625.
68
Id., at 628.
69
Id. at 625.
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disputed.70 Therefore, it could reasonably be inferred that Congress would
understand and approve of the need for extraterritorial protection of a
trademark, without which the mark would lose its value.71
[21] Despite this dispute, as has been mentioned, neither the Court nor
Congress have taken any action to overturn the way the Lanham Act is
interpreted in Steele, regardless of whether it is potentially incongruous
with congressional intent or even international law. Therefore, the basis
of international trademark dispute resolution in the United States still
stems from Steele and its progeny as it interprets the Lanham Act.
C. THE PRESUMPTION OF STRICTLY TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S.
LAW
[22] The Supreme Court has stated that there is a presumption that the
“‘legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial boundaries of the United States.’”72 In
other words, for an Act of Congress to have international effect, it must be
explicitly shown that there was clear intent of Congress to create an
extraterritorial application for the law in question.73 Proponents of the
international application of the Lanham Act posit that this is only a “canon
of statutory construction.”74 Admittedly, it is undisputed that Congress
has definite power to pass laws affecting extraterritorial matters, which is
made all the more certain when U.S. citizens are involved.75
[23] Still, there has been an extensive line of common law applying this
presumption of territoriality, spanning back the length of our nation’s
judicial history.76 The Court found it permissible for congressional
regulation of piracy on the high seas in 1818, but only in the case where

70

Id. at 628.
Id.
72
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) [hereinafter Aramco]
(quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
73
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
74
Bradley, supra note 31, at 510-11.
75
Id.
76
Id., at 511.
71
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specific statutory language shows its intent to do so.77 It held in 1909 that
the Sherman Antitrust Act does not extend to the anti-competitive conduct
of a U.S. defendant company in foreign countries.78 The Court has also
applied the presumption of territorial application to a series of labor law
cases between 1918 and 1963,79 after which point there was a lull during
which some commentators have suggested the presumption seemingly fell
out of favor with the Court.80
[24] The Court then eliminated all doubt as to the applicability of this
presumption with the Aramco decision in 1991.81 In short, Aramco held
that the language of the statute in question lacked sufficient evidence to
warrant applying it extraterritorially, despite several strong indicators to
the contrary.82 The Court ignored the indicators, holding that, to apply the
statute outside of the typical territorial scope (i.e. within the U.S.’s
exclusive jurisdictional borders), the language of the statute would have to
be so specific that it would require no inferences as to whether the statute
extended beyond U.S. borders; rather, it would have to provide clear,
unambiguous evidence that Congress intended an extraterritorial
application.83 The Court reasoned that Congress was well aware of how to
clearly state the intention for a law to apply extraterritorially and had done
so many times in the past.84 Therefore, Congress could have easily written
any intention for extraterritorial application into the statute. Under the
Aramco facts, the Court found it insufficient to simply infer from

77

United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818) (holding that, although Congress did have
the power to regulate the conduct in question over a foreign citizen on a foreign vessel,
they had not yet used that power; the statutory language lacked the required specificity to
include the foreign citizen within its scope).
78
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (holding that, when it
is in doubt as to the intent of the language, the effect of a congressional act must be
limited in its application to only within the realm of its general authority to act).
79
Id. at 512 (citing to a series of labor law cases decided in the Supreme Court between
1918 and 1963).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248-259.
83
See id.
84
Id. at 258.
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essentially “boilerplate” language in the statute that Title VII was meant to
apply extraterritorially.85
[25] The Aramco decision, contrary to the decision reached by the Court
in Steele, seems to again move toward a doctrine consistent with the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The Aramco Court distinguished
Steele on a factual basis, saying that the disparity in the language used in
the statutes did not permit equal treatment as to extraterritorial
application.86 However, some commentators have argued that the Aramco
decision actually represents a return to the presumption of territoriality,
and that Steele simply represents a hiccup in American jurisprudence that
cannot be reconciled with the subsequent decision in Aramco.87
[26] If this is true, and perhaps the Aramco decision has been reached in
such a way that is incompatible with Steele, what defense do trademark
holders have against infringers acting in another jurisdictional territory?
Of several suggestions that have been made by one commentator to
resolve this, the most obvious is for a congressional amendment to the
Lanham Act clearly delineating the transboundary scope of its
protection.88 For now, the Supreme Court’s decision in Steele stands as
the authority for applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially, Aramco and
the presumption against extraterritoriality notwithstanding.
D. ZONES OF EXPANSION AND TERRITORIALITY
[27] Geographic territories are often thought of as the rubric by which
jurisdiction over trademark issues is determined. But it is not always clear
to what extent a product or producer has expanded its market, or to what

85

Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 252-53 (holding that the broader language in the Lanham Act purporting to
exercise power over “all commerce” gives a better indication of Congress’ intent for the
Act to apply extraterritorially than Title VII’s general commerce language).
87
Bradley, supra note 31, at 531-36 (presenting reasons why the Steele decision has
failed to comport with the presumption against extraterritoriality).
88
See id. at 569-84 (suggesting also (1) to bring suit in the foreign country in which the
infringement is taking place; (2) for U.S. courts to apply foreign law; and (3) adapt
contributory infringement principles from other branches of IP law to reach trademark
infringers internationally).
86
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extent they will expand in the future. As a result, to secure marketability
and reputation for trademark owners, the concept of a “natural zone of
expansion” has emerged in common law. A “natural zone of expansion”
refers to a contiguous territory into which it can reasonably be expected
for a mark owner to expand their market beyond their current territory.89
[28] For example, it may very well be foreseeable for a Canadian mark
produced in Toronto to expand south into the United States, depending on
their business model, market strategy, and history of growth. The natural
zone of expansion concept would ideally afford common law protection to
the Canadian mark when it reached the United States. It may, however,
not be foreseeable for that same Canadian mark to conduct expansion into
China, and therefore a concurrent use of a similar mark in the Chinese
market potentially may not be precluded simply based on the existence of
a very similar mark in Canada. But depending on the Canadian mark
owner’s business plan, it may in fact be foreseeable for the Canadian mark
to expand into China, thereby procuring common law protection.
[29] These areas of expansion are only areas of “expected use,” not actual
use, and the expected use must be based on more than the mere conjecture
of a mark owner’s aspiration to expand into an area, so it is necessary to
have a scheme for determining priority over a given area. 90 The Eleventh
Circuit has held that a mark owner who has established goodwill in one
zone using a mark similar to that of another mark owner in another zone is
protected in their original zone, even in the case that they are not first in
time to register their mark (absent bad faith).91 However, a mark owner
who is second in time does not have that same protection in a zone of
expansion; a mark owner who is first in time would likely have priority
over that zone of expansion over a second in time mark owner.92
[30] Needless to say, the notion of zones of expansion has presented many
questions as to the common law application of the principle. The fruition
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of some of these questions first emerged in the case of Vaudable v.
Montmartre, Inc., wherein there was a dispute involving a New York City
restaurateur who was accused of imitating the name and decor of an
internationally famous Parisian restaurant.93 Though the case was decided
on other grounds,94 the international reputation of the Parisian restaurant
ultimately led to the enjoining of the New York restaurateur from doing
business under that famous name.95 The result in this case has led to the
suggestion that “famous marks will be protected from appropriation in the
United States, even if they have never been used here, thus effectively
recognizing an international zone of expansion.”96
[31] This presents a generalized principle regarding common law
protection of trademark, which has been shaped to a far finer standard by
subsequent case law centered primarily on whether or not the infringement
was done in a bad faith attempt to profit from the mark owner’s
reputation.97 In the case of Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart,
Inc., it was again held that the zone of expansion of a foreign mark owner
preserved the right to use that mark outside of normal territorial
restrictions.98 In this case, a Canadian drugstore advertised over the radio
close to the U.S. border, and the radio signals crossed into the United
States.99 When a U.S. drug company in that area began using a similar
trademark, the Canadian drug store brought suit in Federal District
Court.100 The court found against the U.S. drugstore, holding that it was
using the Canadian drugstore’s mark within that Canadian drugstore’s
natural zone of expansion.101 This extended the meaning of the zone of
expansion doctrine to marks even if they were not famous enough to
necessarily warrant protection elsewhere in the world (as in the Vaudable
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case, which afforded protection to the Parisian restaurant based on the
mark’s fame). From this, one can infer that the fact that the mark’s natural
zone of expansion had clearly spanned across territorial borders did not
preclude common law protection of that mark.102
[32] Following this case, the Federal Circuit Court declined to adopt the
doctrine of concurrent territorial use103 and restricted the meaning of “bad
faith” to a relatively narrow standard in the case of Person’s Co. Ltd. v.
Christman.104 In this case, a U.S. manufacturer intentionally copied a
Japanese manufacturer’s mark, who later attempted to enter the U.S.
market.105 The Japanese manufacturer sued, but the court held that
because the Japanese manufacturer’s mark was not famous and the U.S.
manufacturer had no knowledge that the Japanese manufacturer intended
to enter the U.S. market, they did not act in bad faith.106 Further, the court
held that bad faith could not be derived only from prior extraterritorial use
– there must have been “knowledge of a prior actual user in U.S.
commerce.”107
[33] This ruling represented a sharp whittling away in how the courts
would apply the zone of expansion theory. Based on this ruling, it is clear
that the zone of expansion was not going to be applied liberally, thereby
affording little weight to foreign trademarks in the U.S.108 The court
clearly stated that the Japanese mark holder’s claims, though wellfounded, did not have the authority to restrict commerce in the U.S.109
This holding demonstrated that, although the Japanese mark holder
obviously may hold a clear first right to the mark in a zone of expansion,
the effect on U.S. commerce is the first and foremost interest of the court
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as it pertains to law within the U.S. Apparently, the only way that the
court would have found bad faith in the U.S. mark holder’s actions is if
evidence existed indicating that the Japanese mark holder planned to enter
U.S. commerce prior to the U.S. mark holder’s initial use.110 Despite this
limitation on the zone of expansion theory, it remains a useful tool for
looking at the application of trademark law to the Internet.
III. THE INTERNET: ENFORCING THE LANHAM ACT AT LIGHT SPEED
A. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN TRADEMARK ON THE INTERNET
[34] “The fact that the Internet is not in the world of bricks and mortar
raises the question of what actually constitutes trademark ‘use’ on the
Internet.”111 “Use” in trademark infringement over the Internet can take
many forms.112 “Traditional trademark infringement actions are brought
under the Lanham Act on a cause of action for infringement of registered
marks, while Section 43 covers unregistered marks, claims for dilution and
now cybersquatting.”113
[35] There are now several special problems in trademark that result from
“use in commerce” over the Internet. As outlined in Ryan Isenberg’s
article,114 “use in commerce” has expanded to include four unique areas:
domain names, hyperlinks, meta tags, and framing.115 This is of course in
addition to the traditional trademark cases that may arise. Here, “use” on
an Internet website seems to essentially fall within the definition
prescribed by the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” language as it is
typically applied in the general market setting.116 Despite this difference

110

See id. (stating that the Japanese mark holder had no goodwill in the U.S. for the U.S.
mark holder to garner from the use of the mark).
111
Simonyuk, supra note 33 at 2.
112
Isenberg, supra note 20, at 230.
113
Id.
114
Mr. Isenberg’s article provides a cogent background on the history of Internet
Trademark and is referenced passim for background purposes. See Isenberg, supra note
20, at 230–34.
115
Id. at 230-33 (identifying and describing trademark infringement potentially stemming
from these sources).
116
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127 (2000).

18

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

in character, trademark infringement over the Internet stems from the
same roots as its bricks-and-mortar counterparts, such as dilution and
unfair competition.117
[36] Domain names are the first and most immediately apparent area in
which trademark infringement over the Internet can occur. The domain
name of a website, often times simply referred to as a web address, is the
uniquely registered identifier which generally reflects a corporate name or
phrase.118 To procure a web address, a person or entity must simply pay a
nominal fee to Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”) or an agent and pick out a
name not already previously registered.119 Due to the ease with which
domains can be registered, many trademarked domain names were initially
registered by enterprising entities other than the mark’s owners known as
“cybersquatters,” who have been described as “speculator[s] who
knowingly reserve a trademark as a domain name merely to sell it for
profit.”120 NIS’ simple registration system allowed the proliferation of the
cybersquatting phenomenon, with single entities often being responsible
for the hijacking of dozens of famous trademark names.121
[37] A related practice to this is referred to as “typosquatting,” which is
the term used to describe a situation where someone will register a famous
mark with misspellings, reversed letters, or other common typos built into
117

Simonyuk, supra note 33, at 1.
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.1998).
119
See id. (describing Toeppen’s business practice of registering famous marks or names
of companies and then selling the right to use those names to those companies for vast
profits).
120
Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resoution Policy: A Cheaper
Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 HARV. J. L. TECH. 212, 214
(2001) (quoting Jennifer Golenveaux, What’s in a Domain Name? Is “Cybersquatting”
Trademark Dilution?, 33 U.S.F.L.REV. 641, 647 (1999)).]
121
Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of Your Own Domain - An Overview of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 18 COMM. LAW 3, available at
http://www.abanet.org/forums/communication/comlawyer/spring00/mishkin.html (2000)
(describing Dennis Toeppen the “poster child for the cybersquatter” because of his
particularly poignant, numerous and blatant endeavors into cybersquatting, which have
included registering domain names for over 100 registered marks, including Delta
Airlines, Lufthansa, Neiman Marcus, American Standard and Eddie Bauer, and
demanding as much as $15,000 for the rights to a domain name; see Panavision, 141
F.3d at 1316.
118

19

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

the domain name in an attempt to either (a) redirect the web surfer to the
cybersquatter’s own website (rather than the consumer’s intended
website), or (b) get the famous mark’s owner to pay you to redirect the
mistyped web address to the famous web address.122
[38] A third problem that may occur with domain names is that more than
one person may possibly have a legitimate claim to a domain.123 The
seminal example of this is the Nissan case, wherein the Nissan car
company (who was first in time to register their trademark) brought suit
against a computer company of the same name, (after the owner’s
surname) based on trademark infringement after it was found that they had
registered domain names using the word “Nissan.”124 The Nissan court
pointed out that, under the “likelihood of confusion doctrine,” the behavior
of the Nissan computer company had resulted in consumer confusion for
several reasons, including both initial interest confusion and actual
confusion.125 The court found initial interest confusion because the Nissan
name may have led a consumer to believe that this was a website for
Nissan cars, and that alone is enough to find consumer confusion.126 The
court then found actual confusion because of the fact that 90% of Nissan
computer company’s revenue stemmed from visitors to the website
clicking on automobile advertisements displayed on the website.127
Despite this, the court was careful to point out that there is a “judicial
reluctance to enjoin use of a personal name” even when it apparently
infringes on a trademark, but that it was still possible to limit the use with
a “carefully tailored injunction.”128 These examples of abuses and
confusion over domain names led to the need for new legislation. So,
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following these cases (most notably the Toeppen129 cybersquatting cases,
as mentioned supra), Congress enacted anti-cybersquatting legislation in
1999 in the form of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(“ACPA”).130 The general notion behind this was that “without a
legitimate use of a domain name, the rights to use a domain name should
not exist.”131 In addition to this, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”)132 adopted its Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) in order to provide an “alternative to
litigation in dealing with abusive domain name registrations.”133
[39] The second special problem of trademark infringement on the Internet
involves meta tags. Meta tags are essentially background information on
webpages, not readily visible to the viewer of a webpage, that are used by
search engines (such as Yahoo! and Google) to index the content of a
website.134 They are most often thought of in terms of “key words” about
the webpage.135 They are particularly useful in the sense that they allow a
search engine to determine what website might most directly address a
search query entered into it. They are categorized into four main species:
resource type, key word, description, and distribution.136
[40] For example, if a user types in “cook fish old bay” in an effort to
figure out recipes for eating fish, any number of websites could be
returned if they just contain the words “cook,” “fish,” “old,” and “bay.”
Without meta tags, it’s certainly possible that a search engine could return
a useful website; however, it would be just as possible for it to return a
website containing the diary of Captain James Cook, who one day
happened to make an entry in which he caught a large fish off of the Bay
of Bengal when he was 37 years old. The problem here is obvious.
However, employing meta tags, this mistake is much less likely to ever
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happen. The website about cooking fish would have cooking terms, types
of fish, methods of preparation, names of spices, etc., contained in the
meta tags to give information about the focal points of the website;
Captain Cook’s diary would have much different terms. The point of meta
tags is to give more than the simple meaning to the words on the page, and
instead give context.
[41] However, this brings up a whole new setting in which trademark
infringement may occur. The use of registered marks in meta tags has
often provided a basis to bring an offender into court. Some of the more
famous examples involve the use of various “Playboy” trademarks in meta
tag lines.137 Several cases have involved the use of both Playboy and the
term “playmate” in a webpage meta tags.138 Another example involved an
ex-playmate of the year, who was allowed to use the terms “playboy” and
“playmate” in her website’s meta tags for fair use reasons.139
Additionally, the state of the law on this subject has been settled in both
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals140 and Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals,141 who have both recently ruled on the use of meta tags to
infringe upon other entities’ famous marks. In the Seventh’s Circuit’s
2002 opinion, which involved a case of a company using its competitor’s
name in its meta tags, it followed the same line of reasoning as the Ninth
Circuit, holding that the “initial interest confusion” that consumers
experience, whether or not it results in actual confusion once they are
viewing the website, is adequate for the imposition of trademark
infringement liability.142 The court emphasized the overriding importance
of the “misappropriation of [the Plaintiff’s] goodwill,” citing to the priordelivered Ninth Circuit decision, in which the court equated using
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trademarks in meta tags to “posting a sign with another’s trademark in
front of one’s store.”143 The Court went on to suggest that
[c]ustomers believing they are entering the first store rather than
the second are still likely to mill around before they leave. The
same theory is true for websites. Consumers who are directed to [a
defendant’s] webpage are likely to learn more about [a defendant]
and its products before beginning a new search . . . .144
The Promatek decision was later amended to state that meta tag usage by a
defendant is only available when the infringing company is actually using
the trademark in such a way that is “calculated to deceive consumers” into
believing that they are in fact the infringee entity, or that they have some
affiliation with it.145
[42] The third special problem resides in the use of hyperlinks (also
known simply as “links”) on webpages. Hyperlinks are simply marked
instances on a website, generally (though not necessarily) corresponding
to text or graphics, which transport the Internet user to another
webpage.146 Though hyperlinks have not specifically come under fire in
an abundance of trademark litigation as of yet, they certainly have the
potential for it. It has been alleged that hyperlinks can potentially cause
trademark infringement problems in the form of “passing off, reverse
passing off, and false advertising.”147
[43] The last special problem over the Internet involves something
referred to as “framing.” Problems in framing basically stem from a
website retaining its own content on a portion of an Internet user’s screen
as the Internet user goes on to other webpages (thus creating a “frame”
surrounding the second website).148 This particular problem has not yet
had any extensive or dispositive case law around it. However, the most
143

Id. at 813 (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064).
Promatek, 300 F.3d at 813.
145
Id. at 814.
146
Isenberg, supra note 20, at 232–33.
147
Id. at 233.
148
Lloyd L. Rich, Internet Legal Issues: Framing, available at
http://www.publaw.com/framing.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
144

23

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

prominently publicized example is provided by the TotalNews case.149 A
few years ago, the Washington Post and other newspaper publishers
brought suit150 against an Internet news service called TotalNews on
several grounds, claiming that TotalNews’ framing practices were injuring
them.151 In this case, TotalNews was using framing technology to
“display the news organizations' information on the TotalNews [website]
and was surrounding the frames with its own advertising.”152 The plaintiff
newspapers alleged that TotalNews’ practice amounted to trademark
dilution and that the framing practice was likely to confuse users in that
they would be led to believe that the source of these advertisements, etc.,
were in fact the plaintiff newspapers.153 TotalNews ended up settling the
case with the plaintiff news organizations, the terms of which required
TotalNews to stop framing the other news organizations’ websites without
express permission.154 Because Washington Post v. TotalNews never went
to trial, the issues presented in the case remain largely unresolved.
However, some experts have argued that an analogy to a well-settled line
of cases involving the “repackaging” of trademarked goods would serve as
a strong suggestion that another challenge to framing, as in the TotalNews
case, would result in an imposition of liability on the defendant for
violation of trademark law.155
B. APPLYING STEELE TO E-COMMERCE OVER THE INTERNET
[44] Stemming from the aforementioned special trademark infringement
problems presented by the Internet (domain names, hyperlinks, meta tags,
and framing, as well as typical infringement), the extraterritorial
application of trademark law must be addressed. The first issue that must
be addressed is whether Internet infringement ever actually reaches the

149

Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82
MINN. L. REV. 609 (1998).
150
This case was settled before going to trial when TotalNews agreed to discontinue its
practice of framing. See id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.

24

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

question of extraterritoriality.156 If an Internet user accesses a website
from within the United States, regardless of whether the website’s base is
in a foreign territory, it is at least arguable that the mark was used in the
United States, thus negating the need for trademark law that reaches
extraterritorially.157 If the “use” is in fact determined to be “domestic
use,” then it may overcome the fact that either the “physical situs of the
files containing the mark, the server hosting those files, or the individuals
responsible for those files” exist in a foreign territory.158 Thus, the
definition of “use” becomes critical.
[45] This issue was first discussed in the case of Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc. (“Playboy II”).159 In a prior case
(“Playboy I”), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had granted an
injunction enjoining Chuckleberry from using the confusingly similar
mark “Playmen” for the distribution of their Italy-based magazine.160
Despite this, in a parallel suit brought to enjoin Chuckleberry’s use in
Italy, the Italian court upheld the use of the Playmen mark.161 The events
giving rise to this case occurred several years later when Chuckleberry
published an Internet website for its magazine, again using the mark
“Playmen,” based in Italy.162 Playboy brought suit for a violation of the
injunctive order granted in Playboy I, citing that the worldwide nature of
access to Internet website was clearly in violation of the court order.163
The court agreed, stating that the website equated to the circulation of a
magazine (a “use”) within U.S. territory and ordered Chuckleberry to
block U.S. access to the website.164
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[46] While this case seems to give us an answer regarding the question of
applying an extraterritoriality doctrine, commentators have suggested that
the decision should be taken with the understanding that the procedural
context of the case may have been a determinative factor.165 Because the
court was able to exercise jurisdiction over Chuckleberry based on the
prior injunction issued in Playboy I, it is unclear whether the court would
have found in personam jurisdiction in Playboy II if it were brought as an
original action which directly challenged the use of the Playmen mark on a
foreign website (as opposed to being based on a prior action on which
jurisdiction was undisputed).166 Further, because the decision in Playboy
II was rendered from a court sitting in equity for remedial purposes, it is
unclear whether such a result would have been rendered in an original
action.167 Since the issue in Playboy II centered on a prior injunction and
not the Lanham Act, it cannot be wholly ascertained whether the court
would have been able to apply the Lanham Act to this seemingly
extraterritorial situation on the Internet.168
[47] If it should turn out that the more decisive issue in Playboy II was the
procedural context, in which case Playboy II does not support the notion
that access on a computer located within the U.S. equates to a simple
application of the Lanham Act, then it may still be possible to reach
foreign defendants using the Lanham Act’s extraterritorial arms, as
articulated in Steele.169 As mentioned, the Steele case essentially provided
that, if confusingly similar marks are used, even if that use occurs entirely
outside of U.S. territory, it can still be reached by the Lanham Act if it in
any way effects U.S. commerce.170 Should any such questionably
infringing activity take place over the Internet, it has been said that the
worldwide nature of the Internet would lend to finding an effect on U.S.
commerce.171
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[48] The Steele extraterritoriality doctrine could also apply similarly as it
did in a case involving Levi-Strauss.172 In this case, a confusingly similar
product to that of Levi-Strauss’ was sold from China, though never
actually within the United States.173 Based on the fact that the quality of
these goods could reflect poorly174 on the mark owner, the court applied
the Lanham Act extraterritorially, in line with the Steele rule.175
Following the reasoning in Levi-Strauss, one commentator believes that
this quickly translates to the realm of electronic commerce, wherein an
American producer selling their goods over the Internet suffers injury (to
reputation or otherwise) as a result of an infringer using a confusingly
similar mark in a foreign territory, especially if the American producer has
never before acted in that foreign market.176
[49] The Internet provides an infinite thoroughfare by which the U.S.’s
(and other States’) producers may market to the whole world. The
prevalence of the Internet throughout the world breaks down many of the
barriers encased within the Steele decision on the limits of applying the
Lanham Act to foreign defendants. The issue that is presented is whether
the Internet, coupled with the Steele interpretation of the Lanham Act,
confers nearly limitless jurisdiction to the United States to enforce its
trademark law on foreigners who may have otherwise never purposefully
or even knowingly availed themselves to suit in U.S. courts. Corporations
all over the world consider the Internet a literal sine qua non for the
operation of their business. The future (and present, for that matter) of the
business world is e-commerce via the Internet. It is indispensable, for
both tangible and digital goods and services.
[50] This presents the potential for U.S. trademark jurisdiction to expand
far beyond what the Court could have ever imagined or intended in 1952
when it decided Steele. In the midst of the proliferation of e-commerce,
the Steele rule has become dated, and its continued literal application may
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lead to the U.S. interfering with the laws of other nations and international
law.177 Additionally, the other side of that coin is that e-commerce’s
proliferation may render it more possible for foreign trademark owners to
reach U.S. infringers.178 More to the point, the notion of the simple
publication of a website availing a foreign party to the jurisdiction of a
United States or vice versa may become a harsh reality.
[51] Earlier, this article discussed the case of Person’s Co. v. Christman,
involving the Japanese mark owner who had unsuccessfully sought to
enjoin the use of a similar U.S. trademark because of the lack of effect on
U.S. commerce.179 This decision remains well-reasoned; however, in the
context of e-commerce, a court could very well reach a different
decision.180 If the Japanese mark holder had a website on which the mark
was displayed, it would tend to indicate an effect on U.S. commerce, as
the website would make the mark more likely to reach the U.S.181
Additionally, just as the Internet makes it easier for the Lanham Act to
reach foreign infringers of U.S. trademarks through Steele, “the
prerequisites for enforcement against domestic infringers more often be
satisfied in a networked world,” thereby potentially subjecting U.S.
infringers to foreign laws.182
C. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
[52] All of this tends to create a slippery slope, at the bottom of which is
the Internet universally dispensing with jurisdictional requirements in ecommerce. This is not a particularly appealing situation, as control and
predictability are the bedrocks of our judicial system.183 Further, it has
been said that the “current hodgepodge of case law is inconsistent,
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irrational, and irreconcilable” when attempting to fit traditional
jurisdictional analysis case law into the frame of the Internet.184
Therefore, the U.S. must take adaptive steps to avoid a total absence of
standards for predicting jurisdiction in the Internet/e-commerce era. The
Supreme Court has expressly pointed out that “as technological progress
has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for
jurisdiction . . . has undergone a similar increase.”185 As the times change,
so too must the jurisdictional tools of our judicial system develop in
parallel to new technologies.186
[53] A good place to begin the analysis is the Supreme Court decision in
International Shoe, which provides the basis of the United States’ personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence:
[d]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.187
There are two categories of personal jurisdiction as applied to the Internet:
general and specific. General jurisdiction refers to a state exercising
jurisdiction over a defendant “regardless of whether the cause of action
arose from the defendant's activities . . . .”188 It is tested by the standard of
“continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state.189 However,
general jurisdiction has not as of yet been used as a justification for the
exercise of jurisdiction “based solely on the existence of an Internet
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website.”190 Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, is when a defendant’s
acts specifically lead to the accrual of the cause of action in the state
attempting to exercise jurisdiction.191 Specific jurisdiction would be
applicable to the Internet when there exists “substantial contact with the
forum” even in the absence of the “continuous and systematic” contacts
required for general jurisdiction.192 Because specific jurisdiction does not
require a defendant to actually be physically present in the forum state, it
seems to be a more useful and preferred basis for determining Internet
jurisdiction.193
[54] There have been several cases dealing with personal jurisdiction over
the Internet, and have been decided with varying reasoning and results.194
The standard has evolved to distinguishing between active and passive
websites, as formatively articulated in the Zippo case.195 The court
distinguished and classified websites as being either active, passive, or
intermediate, based upon their level of interactivity:
[a]t one end of the spectrum are situations were a
defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the
defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal
jurisdiction is proper . . . at the opposite end are situations
where a defendant has simply posted information on an
Internet website which is accessible to users in foreign
jurisdictions. A passive Web site . . . is not grounds for the
exercise [of] personal jurisdiction . . . The middle ground is
occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can
exchange information with the host computer. In these
cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature
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of the exchange of information that occurs on the
website.196
[55] This test is easily applied at both ends of the sliding scale between
active and passive; it is not until the middle of the scale is approached that
it becomes difficult to distinguish between the websites.197 The courts that
have decided Internet jurisdiction cases have typically required
“something more” than mere Internet advertising in order to find a valid
exercise of jurisdiction; this represents “the dividing line between the
middle ground in the Zippo sliding scale.198 However, it is unclear what
exactly that “something more” is and what factors are relevant to making
this determination; most courts subscribe to the “something more”
definition from the Asahi Metals case.199
[56] To address the jurisdictional issues that are called into question, it has
been suggested that perhaps the Internet requires its own governance and
jurisdiction, independent of territorial law.200 However, this is more of a
fantasy than a workable reality for a number of practicality-based
reasons.201 The most prevalent of these objections are that (1) “no one
lives or works in cyberspace” and (2) no nation can reasonably be
expected to agree to give up significant portions of their sovereignty to
some newly conceived realm of existence.202 “The Internet medium
differs from these other media in a variety of respects, but not so radically
that a declaration of sui generis jurisdictional status is required.”203
Instead, a more reasonable and feasible alternative may be a new
multinational treaty on the application of trademark law given the new “e”
face of international commerce.204

196

Id. at 1124.
Gasparini, supra note 186, at 200.
198
Id.
199
Id. (noting two competing lines of thought among the current Supreme Court).
200
Burk, supra note 18, at 733.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
See id.
197

31

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

IV. CONCLUSION: THE INTERNATIONAL INTERNET TRADEMARK TREATY
[57] Given the above inquiry into the nature of trademark law as it applies
internationally, it appears that, while there is currently a regime in place
for dealing with questions as dictated in Steele, that regime was written for
an earlier age and may not necessarily adapt well to the Internet and ecommerce. It is true that the present regime for dealing with trademark
law appears to successfully adapt to issues in domestic trademark that
arise out of the Internet. However, it may be necessary to develop a new
regime for the handling of international trademark law issues, specifically
formulated to address the apparent borderless-ness of the Internet.
Whether or not one chooses to agree with the ruling in Steele, it is in fact
the current state of U.S. law as it pertains to the international reach of
trademarks, Aramco notwithstanding. The difficulties encountered in the
international application of the Lanham Act over the Internet presents an
opportunity to thoroughly and meaningfully update the regime left behind
by Steele, as has been suggested by critics.
[58] The growing trend seems to be toward a harmonization of
international intellectual property law.205 Even experts who have argued
for the benefit of not harmonizing intellectual property law for the
potential positive effects it may yield in the marketplace have come down
on the side of an international regulation regime for the enforcement of
international trademark on the Internet.206 An international treaty toward
this end, adopted with the hopes of protecting international trademark
fairly and consistently, would be an ideal solution. The purpose of this
harmonization would be to enable mark owners to predict with some
certainty the legal outcomes of steps they may take in the use of
trademarks, which will result in an ultimately better protection for mark
holders all over the world. Additionally, such a harmonization would

205

Schechter, supra note 47, at 632 (pointing to the TRIPS agreement as evidence of a
growing trend toward uniformity in international intellectual property law).
206
Burk, supra note 18, at 735 (suggesting that jurisdictions could potentially attract
consumers and businesses by experimenting with variations in their intellectual property
law regimes, but because of trademark’s radically different role than copyright and patent
in the marketplace, a scheme of international regulation may prove to be more
appropriate).

32

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

decrease the risk of loss to foreign and domestic market participants, as it
promotes fairness in how it applies to those trademark holders.
[59] The Internet’s influence has brought the necessity for comprehensive
international standards for trademark protection to a critical point, and
regardless of which direction we go from here, the result must reflect the
reality of our globalized commercial society. Any proposed solution that
neglects to adequately address this reality is a failure on its face and will
only serve to further complicate the issue.
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